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FROM RIGHTS TO ARRANGEMENTS
DanielR. Ortiz*
Election law is fast becoming a "discipline." No longer do we
see it as an ad hoc agglomeration of largely unconnected bits and
pieces of doctrine from other disciplines, like constitutional law. Indeed, we now devote competing casebooks to it;' give it its own slot
in the curriculum; appoint experts in it to the faculties of major law
schools; and fund conferences where these same experts can regularly applaud themselves and their many good works while fattening
their frequent flyer accounts. By any traditional measure, the field is
booming and needs no boosters. Even some good writing appears in
it.
So what, if anything, has this consolidation of election law accomplished? Has emancipating doctrinal categories like campaign
finance and reapportionment from the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause and then lumping them together with each
other worked anything more than an aesthetic reconfiguration? Does
the servitude of these doctrines to a new discipline really change
them? If it does, does it change them for the better? Perhaps all our
professional effort has just exchanged one set of unhelpful disciplinary boundaries for another.
The rise of this discipline has made a difference-a profound
one, in fact. Consolidating the pieces has not just created a new forum in which to discuss the same old issues, but has changed the way
many of us look at those issues. By refocusing attention away from
some relationships to new ones, the development of election law as a
discipline has worked a great and helpful change. The purpose of
this brief symposium contribution is to suggest that this restructuring
* John Allan Love Professor of Law, and Elizabeth D. Merrill & Richard
A. Merrill Research Professor, University of Virginia.
1. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
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has improved analysis in two ways. First, it has broadened our understanding of how various electoral rules affect individual interests,
and second, it has led us away from a largely rights-based, individual-centered view of politics, to a more pragmatic and structural
view of politics as a matter of institutional arrangements. In the latter view, we analyze electoral rules, whether they concern redistricting, ballot access, or campaign finance, not only by how they directly
affect traditional individual rights, like free speech, but also by how
they affect the overall dynamic and health of our political system and
the relationships among its major players.
The difference is one of emphasis. The first view, a more traditional approach, focuses on the immediate-though possibly
oblique-effects of rules on long-recognized individual rights. The
second view focuses more on the rules' structural implications, on
how the rules advantage and disadvantage different types of institutional players relative to each other, and how the rules change incentives for various types of political behavior. Although a traditionalist
might complain that this new focus overlooks the primary role of the
individual in politics, an institutionalist would respond that it is the
structure that both enables and constrains individual political activity. Buckley v. Valeo,2 one of the central cases of the election law
canon, illustrates how individualism and institutionalism differ and
how institutionalism offers the fuller account of politics. Buckley
shows, if only by example, the kinds of changes disciplinary reorganization can make.
After Watergate, Congress extensively amended the Federal
Election Campaign Act to regulate many forms of campaign spending, including individual contributions to and expenditures on behalf
of political candidates.4 In reviewing these particular provisions, the
Buckley Court developed the basic constitutional framework for
judging nearly all campaign finance reform. First, and most importantly, the Court located the dispute within existing conceptual and
doctrinal categories. Buckley was clearly a First Amendment case.
2. 424 U.S. 1(1976) (per curiam).
3. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1976) (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 608 (Supp. IV 1970).
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Although the case raised associational issues, it centrally concerned
free speech:
The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate
in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of
the system of government established by our Constitution.
The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to
such political expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people." Although First
Amendment protections are not confined to "the exposition
of ideas," "there is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs, . . . of course includ[ing] discussions of candidates" .... "[I]t can hardly
be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest
and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office." 5
The case fell not only within the ambit of the First Amendment,
but within the very core of its concern for political speech.
The Court was not just waving the flag. Campaign finance restrictions do implicate traditional speech interests. The reformers
admitted as much when they tried to distinguish Buckley as a special
kind of free speech case. They argued that Buckley, like United
States v. O'Brien,6 the draft card burning case, involved conduct
primarily and speech only incidentally.7 Their admission, however,
although perhaps necessary, gave up too much. By classifying the
case in terms of the First Amendment, the Court brought the whole
conceptual apparatus of free speech doctrine to bear on the issueswhether it fit them or not. The case was framed almost exclusively

5. 424 U.S. at 14-15 (citations omitted) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948);
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); and Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
6. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
7. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-19.
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as involving a single type of participation right. Other interests were
left out.
Consider how moving campaign finance issues to a different
conceptual framework, like election law, changes things. Seeing
campaign finance issues through an election law lens still makes the
participation rights of political speakers an object of concern.
Speech about candidates and issues is, after all, an important part of
election law.8 This new lens, however, invites us to see speaking
rights as only one of several important interests. By highlighting
connections between campaign finance and issues of voter and can-

didate participation-such as poll taxes; one-person, one-vote; and
ballot access-this lens brings into focus several other issues that the
free speech framework largely ignores. To a small degree, of course,
these issues appear in the background of Buckley itself, but they are
barely visible.9 Seeing campaign finance as part of the new election
of bringing previously peripheral conlaw discipline has the effect
0
center.'
and
front
full
cerns
First, this new approach encourages us to view campaign finance as implicating not just a narrow right of individual political
speech, but also a broader right of individual electoral participation.
The Court has rejected many formal and informal restrictions on who
can participate in elections, political party nominating events, 12 and
the even more informal processes leading up to party nominating
events.' 3 While the Court has never found a general right to vote in

8. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
9. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30-35 (discussing impact on incumbency rates

and minority parties).
10. This is not to say that Buckley would necessarily have come out differently under this new approach. The bottom line might have remained the
same. The reasoning, however, would have been much more responsive to the
full range of individual and institutional interests at stake.
11. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969)
(invalidating a New York statute that excluded from participation in school
district elections voters who neither owned real property within the school district nor had children enrolled in the school district); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll tax).
12. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (invalidating white primary).
13. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (invalidating unofficial, preparty primary).
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the Constitution, it has found in equal protection a right not to be denied the vote to the extent others have it. 14 The Court has, for example, struck down poll taxes under the fundamental rights strand of
equal protection because
[v]oter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to
paying or not paying this or any other tax ....
Wealth... is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.... To introduce wealth
or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications
15
is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.
Many reformers, of course, have pressed this connection. 16 Just
as the state cannot condition the right to vote on payment of a fee, it
cannot, they argue, condition the right to speak on having a certain
amount of money. The Court would certainly strike down a state licensing fee for political speech. These reformers then stir in the
logic of the Court's right-to-appointed-counsel cases. Just as the
Court held that states could not allow market inequalities to make
certain differences in the criminal justice system, 7 the reformers argue that the state cannot allow some people's inferior position in the
economic market to place them at a severe disadvantage in the public
electoral process.
These reformers are right. If we locate campaign finance issues
within the fundamental rights strand of equal protection, we will
come close to placing an affirmative obligation on the state to maintain very rough equality among election speakers. Many will object,
of course, that campaign finance differs crucially both from requiring
a license to speak and from not providing an indigent criminal defendant with a court-appointed attorney. In the first case, the state is
not passively relying on market inequalities but actively constructing
14. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969);

Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
15. Harper,383 U.S. at 666-68 (footnote omitted).

16. See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The ConstitutionalImperative and
PracticalSuperiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1160 (1994); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the
Wealth Primary,11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 273 (1993).
17. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,

351 U.S. 12, 16-19 (1956).
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a hurdle of its own. In the second, some might think the underlying
right needs more protection. The point here, however, is not to decide which side is right, but only to show that shifting the lens
through which we view campaign finance from the right to free
speech to the right to participate highlights completely different issues. It radically transforms the terms of the debate, but does not
necessarily settle it.
Second, we could see campaign finance issues as implicating
one-person, one-vote concerns. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court decided that different election districts for the same class of political
office within a single political jurisdiction could not contain substantially different numbers of people.' 8 Federal election districts, it later
held, had to achieve almost exact mathematical equality,' 9 while
state legislative and local districts were given somewhat more leeway. The Court reasoned that the Equal Protection Clause requires
each citizen to have an equal say in candidate elections. 2 1 Giving
one district of 200,000 people the same number of representatives as
a district of 100,000 people clearly violated this notion of political
equality.22
Reading campaign finance issues in light of these cases gives
campaign finance issues a new spin. The question becomes less
whether campaign finance regulation trenches on an individual's
right to speak and more whether allowing some people or entities to
spend more money on elections gives them more power over ultimate political outcomes. Like the analogy to the right of participation cases, this approach stresses that spending implicates voting just
as much as speech. But, just as before, this shift in perspective may
deepen analysis without necessarily answering the bottom-line question. One might believe that even if this type of inequality is bad,
correcting it would only worsen the problem.
This shift of perspective has much intuitive appeal, if only because the new perspective fits some of the experience it describes
18. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (state legislative districts).
19. See Karcher v. Dagget 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1983).
20. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1973).
21. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-68.
22. See id. at 562-64.
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better than the old one. The free speech framework, for example,
explains only a small part of why people make contributions and independent expenditures. This framework views such spending more
as a way for the speaker to express ideas than as a way to get a candidate elected. 23 This view leads the Court to distinguish contributions and independent expenditures from each other in an odd way.
Viewed in a purely expressive manner, contributions-money given
to a group to spend at its own discretion-represent second-rate
speech. They signal only the fact that a particular contributor likes a
particular candidate, but not what their shared ideas are or how
strongly the contributor likes the candidate.24 In other words, they
express a bond between the contributor and the candidate, yet reveal
almost nothing about that bond. Independent expenditures, on the
other hand, do communicate the speaker's own ideas because the
speaker controls how the money is spent. 25 For this reason, they represent a kind of first-rate speech. The distinction between contributions and independent expenditures, the most troubling, often criticized, but significant feature of the Court's reasoning in Buckley,
thus springs directly from the free speech lens the Court uses to see
the case. To the Court, independent expenditures deserve more protection than contributions not because they are more important to the
spender or to the candidate, but because their direct expressive content is richer.
This may be true, but it completely misses the point of why people make contributions and independent expenditures. People primarily spend money on candidates to help them win, not to ventilate
the contributors' own ideas. If the free speech view of spending
were really pertinent, for example, people would make expenditures
23. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-23.
24. As the Court put it:
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for
the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does
not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index ofthe intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate.
Id. at 21.
25. See id. at 19-20.
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and seldom make contributions. Expenditures, after all, pack a much
greater direct expressive punch.26 But people typically make independent expenditures only when they have "maxed out" on contributions, that is, made the maximum the law allows. And the reason is
clear. People want their candidates to win. When I contribute to
someone, I care less about whether the candidate expresses my own
ideas in the campaign than whether I can count on having the winning candidate's vote in the legislature. Campaign speech is important to me mostly insofar as it helps get my candidate elected. The
one-person, one-vote framework captures this insight nicely. If we
see spending more like voting-as a way of getting a candidate
elected, not as a way of better promoting the speaker's own thoughts
in the general marketplace of ideas-contributions and expenditures
make much more sense and it is easy to understand why people prefer contributions over independent expenditures. Contributions are
simply a more effective way of getting a candidate elected. The candidate knows best how to spend to win.
Finally, we can view campaign finance in light of the ballot access cases. In most of these cases, minor parties or independent candidates challenged rules that made it difficult for them to get a place
on the ballot.27 Although the Court has justified many of these laws
as necessary for an orderly election process 2 8 many commentators
have suggested a different motivation. They see these rules as ways
for the two existing major parties to keep out competition. 29 By creating high barriers to entry, the two major parties can maintain duopoly power over the political process.
Although the courts have downplayed these kinds of concerns
in campaign finance, commentators on both sides of the debate
have seen obvious connections. Some deregulationists claim that
campaign finance regulation serves to entrench incumbents of both

26. See id.
27. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
28. See id. at 358; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
29. See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme
Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democratsand Republicans
from PoliticalCompetition, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 331; Samuel Issacharoff &
Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: PartisanLockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
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major parties. 30 Reformers, on the other hand, argue that inadequate
regulation can entrench incumbents against challenge.3 The point
here is not to take sides in this debate, but to point out that the ballot
access framework puts these larger concerns that the free speech
framework overlooks full front and center.
The ballot access analogy also points to a different kind of
weakness in the free speech paradigm. Unlike the right to vote and
one-person, one-vote analogies, which brought into focus other individual interests that the free speech paradigm ignored, the ballot access analogy raises concerns that run beyond the individual. It points
to the larger institutional effects that various campaign finance regimes can have. How does a particular regulatory regime affect the
competitiveness of non-incumbents? How does it affect the competitiveness of minor parties and independent candidates? Just as
important, how does it affect the legislative process? Does it systematically advantage certain groups within the legislature? The
Court's traditional free speech focus deals awkwardly, if at all, with
these important concerns. It also causes us to overlook much of the
significance of political intermediaries, players like political action
committees, political parties, corporations, unions, and public interest groups, all of which play important roles in our politics. The free
speech paradigm sees them primarily as ways of aggregating individual expression, which misses the critical monitoring and disciplining functions these intermediaries perform.32
Interestingly, academics on both sides of the campaign finance
debate are more sensitive to these issues than are the courts. As the
field of election law develops, scholarly analysis seems to be moving
away from an almost exclusive focus upon individual speech, instead
focusing on other types of individual interests and on the larger
effects on institutional arrangements. Prominent deregulationists,
30. See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258 (1994); Bradley A.
Smith, FaultyAssumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996).

31. See Cass R. Sunstein, PoliticalEquality and UnintendedConsequences,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1400-03 (1994).
32, See BeVier, supra note 30, at 1276 (discussing monitoring role); Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing through Intermediaries,VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1999) (discussing monitoring and disciplining functions).
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like Lillian BeVier and Bradley Smith, argue that campaign finance
regulation will have deleterious structural effects, 33 while reformers
like Ronald Dworkin and Cass Sunstein talk about how campaign finance regulation
can improve the structural arrangements of our po34
system.
litical
Will the courts move from seeing campaign finance regulation
as an awkward step-child of the First Amendment to seeing it as implicating the same kinds of individual and structural concerns that
other election law cases do? There is hope, but progress will be slow
and fitful. The old picture has a deep hold on us. We need nothing
less than a fundamental shakeup of current conceptual and doctrinal
categories. Still there is precedent. Consider the influence of law
and economics on private law. Although we still teach tort, contract,
and property in separate courses, in many law schools, concerns like
incentive effects, activity levels, and the Coase Theorem 35 organize
them all. This thinking has gradually crept into the cases. Similarly,
many deep cultural assumptions have also crept into constitutional
doctrine despite the Constitution itself. The party system, for example, appears nowhere in the Constitution and is, in fact, deeply antithetical to the Framers' original beliefs.36 Yet the Court now sees it
as an institution worthy of particular constitutional respect. 37 Doctrine will clearly lag behind, but we may hope that as election law
develops as a discipline, it will lead the courts, and the courts will
follow.

33. See BeVier, supra note 30, at 1267; Smith, supra note 30, at 1050.
34. See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1390-91; Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of
American Politics,N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19.
35. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
36. See ISSACHAROFFETAL, supra note 1, at 187-89.
37. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).

